The Russian invasion of Ukraine has certainly changed the world of international relations in just a matter of weeks.
And it’s easy to see how states might look at the conflict and feel they need a nuclear deterrent in an era of great power competition, as stated by writers Steve Cimbala and Lawrence Korb in their story “Nuclear Proliferation is not the Answer in Ukraine.”
Under the protocols of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty were guaranteed by the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia. Russia has now violated this agreement twice: first in its 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent invasion of the Donbas and again, in its 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. One of potential fallouts of the invasion is individual states attempting to acquire nuclear weapons.
Many states will most likely adopt a small nuclear deterrent to ward off a possible invasion. North Korea’s small but growing nuclear arsenal increases the costs and risks of launching a military intervention to depose the Kim dynasty. Iran’s overall policies and nuclear weapons ambitions reflect its desire to dominate the greater Middle East, but the Iranian leadership may likewise view a nuclear arsenal as an insurance policy against military intervention, either to overthrow the ruling elites or in response to Iran-sponsored terrorism.
In the Indo-Pacific region, nuclear weapons have already spread. Russia, China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan all possess nuclear weapons, increasing the risk that one will cross the nuclear threshold should a conventional war threaten their national survival. With the region’s growing conventional forces, the whole region is becoming more volatile.
It’s important to remember that China is growing its nuclear arsenal of land-based strategic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and long-range bombers, with some projecting that China will be able to deploy 1,000 or more warheads on strategic launch systems as early as 2030. History gives us examples of why states break the peace and go to war with one another. According to Ancient Greek General and Historian Thucydides, states war for reasons of fear, honor, or interest. Leaders can rationalize away seeming difficulties in the way of success, making arguments about their opponents’ weakness and their own strength. Heads of state and supreme warlords can come to believe their own propaganda. Rationality can be relative, and highly subject to biases and ideological blind spots.
Individual states don’t have much to gain from going nuclear. The threshold for using them is high and most military coercion takes place at lower levels.
Considering the downside costs of regional nuclear arms races—including massive financial costs, increased risks of proliferation or accidents, and potential sanctions—it is doubtful that any state in the Middle East or the Indo-Pacific will improve their security by developing nuclear weapons. Several states with small-to-medium sized nuclear arsenals will create anxieties about first strike capabilities. Few of these states can afford something like a fleet of ballistic missile submarines, the most survivable platforms among operationally deployed launch systems. Cimbala and Korb point out the dangers: “these countries will therefore depend almost exclusively on aircraft or missiles that are less survivable and require their commanders to preempt their opponents. More states will deploy more forces, fears of a surprise attack will multiply, and the need for survivable counter-strike capabilities will lead to more nuclear weapons deployed on a ‘hair trigger.’”
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine might lead some to think that more nuclear weapons are the key to safety, but the opposite is true. Nuclear deterrence in a multi-polar world is different than in a bi-polar world. The US-Soviet Russia rivalry provided a certain amount of security because of the political stability of the two blocks. Today, Asia is crowded with nuclear powers and these weapons aren’t accountable to the people in the countries because these aren’t democratic nation-states.
As stated earlier in this story, leaders with or without nuclear weapons are perfectly willing to act in ways that some might judge as “irrational.” This means nuclear weapons aren’t the path to more security.
Jason Sibert is the Lead Writer for the Peace Economy Project.
From The Progressive Populist, June 1, 2022
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