Cooling Russia’s Nuclear Threat

By JASON SIBERT

Russia’s threatened use of nuclear weapons to win the war in Ukraine rightly creates a sense of fear throughout the world.

And some see the current tensions of Cold War II as the death of arms control. Writer Farah Sonde addressed this issue in her wonderful story “The Fallacies of the Arms Control Debate in a Times of Tension.” Russia recently suspended the implementation of certain provisions in the New START treaty, and Sonde correctly stated that the most common concern is not nuclear blackmail, but the absence of a treaty to replace New START. A set of relevant questions highlighted her story: “so, if arms control doesn’t work amidst conflict, is it obsolete? Is it time to ditch non-proliferation and embrace the nuclear modernization program? The problem here lies in a fundamental misunderstanding of arms control itself, that arms control and tensions between nuclear powers are mutually exclusive.” 

Ever since the dawn of nuclear weapons in World War II, we’ve done our best to keep from using them via arms control. Sure, the competition grew fierce in the first Cold War, but many major nuclear arms treaties came to life in that conflict. When the race over intercontinental ballistic missiles heated up, a key arms control treaty - the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 – became law; it outlawed the testing or deployment of nuclear weapons in space.

In the administration of President John Kennedy, he and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty to slow the arms race, even though the Cold War still raged. This process led to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in the late 1960’s. War and tensions do not have to be the end of nuclear arms control, as they can be a wake-up call. Recent Russian actions showcase the country’s belligerent side, but let’s not make any predictions about the future. Current rhetoric coming from the political sector ignores the history of conflict mediation.

Economically, the impacts of our nuclear arsenal are felt every day, and despite the fears stated at the beginning of this story, nuclear weapons are not a factor in Ukraine. Let’s try to learn from the history of arms control and international relations. As Sonde pointed out, the lesson in the Ukrainian war should be that excessive defense budgets don’t necessarily mean more security. Our massive military budget didn’t keep Putin from invading Ukraine. The key arms control agreements of the first Cold War came after the Cuban Missile Crises (OST and NPT) and toward the end of that conflict – in the 1970’s and 1980’s. Politicians feel that arms control creates winners and losers, and they don’t want to be on the losing side of the game. When military budgets are high, political leaders feel that they can project an image of “strength” via even higher budgets.

The most important factor in arms control – it brings transparency, important when talking about something as destructive as nuclear weapons. An arms control regime allows foes to monitor each other’s arsenals. This works as a barrier to politicians that push for arms buildups on the idea that the adversary is more dangerous than previously thought. The transparency present also works against miscalculation, so important in nuclear weapons.

The arms control deals of the late Cold War came at a time of Soviet Russia’s weakening due to the containment policy of the United States and its allies. Remember, the war in Ukraine continues to grind away at Russia’s strength. When one side in a conflict endures weakening, that side often must resort to arms control to keep from being weakened even more by further decades of high defense spending. Perhaps we will enter the arms control mode earlier than expected in Cold War II. Let’s not forget this valuable tool!

Jason Sibert of St. Louis, Mo., is the Lead Writer for the Peace Economy. St. Louis, Mo. Email jasonsibert@hotmail.com.

From The Progressive Populist, June 1, 2023

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